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Abstract
This article introduces the global Pro-Government Militias Database (PGMD). Despite the devastating record of
some pro-government groups, there has been little research on why these forces form, under what conditions they
are most likely to act, and how they affect the risk of internal conflict, repression, and state fragility. From events in
the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Sudan, or Syria and the countries of the Arab Spring we know that pro-government
militias operate in a variety of contexts. They are often linked with extreme violence and disregard for the laws of
war. Yet research, notably quantitative research, lags behind events. In this article we give an overview of the PGMD,
a new global dataset that identifies pro-government militias from 1981 to 2007. The information on pro-government
militias (PGMs) is presented in a relational data structure, which allows researchers to browse and download different
versions of the dataset and access over 3,500 sources that informed the coding. The database shows the wide pro-
liferation and diffusion of these groups. We identify 332 PGMs and specify how they are linked to government, for
example via the governing political party, individual leaders, or the military. The dataset captures the type of affilia-
tion of the groups to the government by distinguishing between informal and semi-official militias. It identifies,
among others, membership characteristics and the types of groups they target. These data are likely to be relevant
to research on state strength and state failure, the dynamics of conflict, including security sector reform, demobiliza-
tion and reintegration, as well as work on human rights and the interactions between different state and non-state
actors. To illustrate uses of the data, we include the PGM data in a standard model of armed conflict and find that
such groups increase the risk of civil war.
Keywords
armed groups, conflict, dataset, pro-government militias
Introduction
The activities of pro-government militias have been a
feature of recent uprisings, as illustrated by events in
Libya, Bahrain, and Syria. Pro-government militias
have been active in many different contexts around the
globe, but research has not kept pace with this
development, largely due to lack of systematic data. The
Pro-Government Militias Database (PGMD) intends to
fill this gap by identifying these militias and irregular
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armed groups that are linked to government authorities
between 1981 and 2007.
The PGMD enables research on state capacity, human
rights, and civil war to address new questions. While we
know of the impact of poverty, natural resources, terrain,
regime type, and ethnicity on armed conflict (e.g. Collier
& Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Hegre & Sam-
banis, 2006), less attention has been paid to agents and
organizations that carry out the violence – although the
importance of the organization of the security sector is
recognized (Toft, 2009). Recent research has examined
the fragmentation of rebel groups (e.g. Bakke, Cunning-
ham & Seymour 2012; Cederman & Gleditsch, 2009;
Cunningham, 2011), but the government usually is
assumed to be a unitary actor. Case evidence suggests that
this conceptualization is often misleading. Despite the
effect that pro-government militias can have on the polit-
ical, economic, and social stability and security of civilians,
with the notable exception of Ahram’s (2011a) analysis of
Janowitz’s (1977) data, there is little quantitative research
on these groups. This research lags behind the case study
literature in analyzing the impact of these groups with, for
example, studies of death squads in El Salvador (Stanley,
1996) and paramilitary groups elsewhere in Latin America
(Centeno, 2002; Mazzei, 2009), the military’s arming of
political party organizations in Indonesia (Cribb, 2001:
233; see also Robinson’s (1995: 228) discussion of
‘semi-official armed gangs’), or the use of the Bakassi Boys
by a state governor in Nigeria (Reno, 2002).1 There are
currently no systematic measures of these informal violent
organizations that act on behalf of the government.
To evaluate the conditions under which these groups
form, to understand the relationship between them and
the governments of the countries in which they operate,
to know what is case specific and what is more general
about them, and to analyze their consequences for the
nature of conflict and for the prospects for peace, we need
such measures. The PGMD allows researchers to examine
under what conditions these informal actors form and
operate. It provides a missing element useful for the study
of state strength, violence and human rights violations,
security sector issues and the prospects for peace, and pos-
sibly political cleavages and electoral violence. As case
researchers (Staniland, 2012: 23) note, there are ‘daunt-
ing’ challenges to collecting such data. The data collection
is an observational process designed to capture the variety
of informal armed groups across continents while organiz-
ing knowledge of them in a coordinated and systematic
way. A complete listing of all such groups would be ideal,
as would comprehensive listings of all episodes of political
violence or human rights violations (see Morrow, 2007:
563). Our data provide a basis for examining patterns and
associations and a platform for further observations. In
this article we give an overview of the theoretical argument
that initiated the project, the data collection procedure
and its challenges, and the features and limitations of the
database. We show how the data can usefully be added to
standard models of armed conflict.
Pro-government militias (PGMs)
The project stems from the puzzle of why governments
with regular forces delegate to informal groups. Govern-
ments face more severe agency problems with militias,
yet may be tempted to use these groups to add numbers
or local knowledge, or to evade accountability for strate-
gically useful violence as in the Sudan. The question is
whether governments can’t control or won’t control these
groups (Mitchell, 2004). This logic offers a general
explanation of these groups beyond cultural explanations
or Weberian accounts of militias as constitutive of state
failure (Bates, 2008). We distinguish the formation of
these groups from a particular condition of a country,
such as disorder, civil war, or state failure. If there are
general incentives to delegate to these groups (e.g.
increasing deployed forces or avoiding accountability)
we expect them to work across cultural, geographical,
and even political systems and these groups to be more
numerous and more widely distributed than Weberian
conceptions of states seeking to monopolize violence
would suggest. Our data collection supports this assump-
tion. We have identified 332 pro-government militias
distributed around the world between 1981 and 2007.
The relationship between these groups, disorder, civil
wars, and state failure are empirical questions that can
be evaluated with this new dataset.
We define a PGM as a group that
1. is identified as pro-government or sponsored by the
government (national or subnational),
2. is identified as not being part of the regular security
forces,
3. is armed, and
4. has some level of organization.
Criterion 1: The group is identified by the media
source, which is discussed in more detail below, as pro-
government or sponsored by the government, either on
1 For a historical discussion of pirates and mercenaries see Thomson
(1996). For a discussion of death squads see Campbell & Brenner
(2000). For a discussion of Indonesia, Iraq and Iran see Ahram (2011b).
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the national or subnational level. There are a variety of
possible links between the group and the government,
including information sharing, financing, equipping,
training, and an operational link. We adopt a conservative
approach. Simply sharing an enemy with the government
or evidence that a group does not oppose the government
or is simply tolerated by the government is insufficient for
the group to be considered as pro-government. Depend-
ing on the available information, the data include more
details on the nature of the link to government.
Criterion 2: The group is not part of the regular state
security force. However, the PGM may operate with the
regular forces, or even be composed of members of the
security forces organized clandestinely as an unofficial or
informal group (e.g. death squads). This relationship with
the regular forces might include, in addition to sharing of
personnel, information sharing, joint operations or training.
Criterion 3: The group is equipped for violence, but
does not have to commit violence to be included. This
criterion is not limited to firearms; some groups are
equipped with machetes or clubs.
Criterion 4: The group has some evidence of organiza-
tion, for example an identifiable leader, name, or a geo-
graphical, ethnic, religious or political basis. We exclude
‘flash’ or spontaneous mobs.
We do not select groups on how long they are pro-
government, but only on these four criteria. When a
group fails to fulfil these, then the group is coded as termi-
nated as a PGM according to our definition. This includes
the disarmament or banning of the group by the govern-
ment or its integration into the regular security forces. If a
president or party ceases to be in government, then the
PGMs affiliated with them also cease to be PGMs.
Groups can also cease to be classified as PGMs as a result
of a border change. For example, armed groups linked to
the Indonesian government were active in East Timor,
fighting the independence movement. These pro-
Indonesia groups end in our dataset with the transition
government that was put in place in East Timor in
December 1999, although some of these groups were still
active within Timor-Leste after 1999. But they were then
linked to the Indonesian government, so no longer fitted
our definition of a domestic pro-government militia.
Affiliation with government: Informal and
semi-official PGMs
While all groups in the database are pro-government, their
affiliation with government varies. In some instances the
government tries to keep the group at arm’s length, while
in other cases governments openly create, train, and pay
such groups. For example, village defense forces that have
been created by governments fall under this second cate-
gory, where the link to the PGM is far more open and
institutionalized than in the case of the Janjaweed. As
an initial effort to capture affiliation with the government
we use two categories, informal and semi-official PGMs.
Informal PGMs are armed, supported by or act on
the side of the government and are described as pro-
government, governmentmilitia, linked to the government,
government-backed, or government-allied. Examples
include the Young Patriots in Cote d’Ivoire, the Ansar-e
Hezbollah in Iran, and the InterahamweMilitia in Rwanda
during the early 1990s. ‘Death squads’, even when closely
linked to the government, are normally informal and clan-
destine, and are categorized as informal PGMs.
A semi-official PGM has a recognized legal or semi-
official status, in contrast to the looser affiliation of infor-
mal PGMs. A semi-official PGM is separate from the
regular forces and identified as a distinct organization.
Examples of semi-official PGMs include Village Defence
Committees in India, the Revolutionary Committees in
Libya under Gaddafi, and the Rondas Campesinas in
Peru. In many countries, the term ‘paramilitary’ refers
to regular forces, or police units with some military status
which are not included in the PGM dataset.
Overview of the PGMD
The PGMD contains open source information about
pro-government armed groups obtained from LexisNexis
searches of news sources from around the world. The
sources include transcripts translated into English in
BBC World Summaries of local news, Agence France
Presse, Xinhua General News Service, and major inter-
national newspapers. Search terms included ‘government
militia’, ‘paramilitary’, ‘government death squads’, ‘gov-
ernment irregular forces’, and ‘vigilante’, and returned
numerous documents, many of them off-topic. While
this broad search strategy was heavily labour-intensive,
we reduced the risk of missing information. Users of the
data have access to over 3,500 key sources that informed
the coding decisions. The dataset covers 178 countries
for the time period from 1981 to 2007, and for 88 coun-
tries we found evidence of at least one PGM during this
time period.2 We focus on pro-government groups active
within their own borders. Acknowledging the scope of
the dataset, the dynamic nature of the relationship
between groups and governments, and the complicated
2 We have excluded Lebanon and Somalia due to difficulties in
identifying governments over the time period.
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task of imposing a uniform coding scheme on disparate
open source information on a global scale, researchers
made a concerted effort to cross-check the information
to ensure consistency. The coding has been checked
independently by at least three researchers, more in most
cases. But no further claims are made about the accuracy
of this information.
The PGMD consists of a relational data structure that
links 16 tables representing aspects of the data, from
armed groups themselves and their membership and tar-
get characteristics, to group actions, to the documentary
evidence researchers used to create the dataset. Although
we focus here on combinations of groups, countries, and
years as units of analysis, the relational structure allows
separate data matrices to be constructed for any combi-
nation of our 16 tables of information. The data struc-
ture is realized as a Sqlite database.3 The database
supports distributed web-based coding and a searchable
website that can be used to browse and download the
PGM data.
In the following, we discuss the key variables and pro-
vide details on specific datasets drawn from our database.
The data that use the pro-government militia as the unit
of analysis include variables on their links to their gov-
ernment and membership characteristics. The database
contains information on the alleged targets and purpose
of the PGMs, as well as other information discussed
below.
Origin and termination
For each PGM we recorded formation and termination
dates. When no such date was given in the sources, we
recorded the date the group was first mentioned.4 As a
termination date we coded the date when a group ceased
to be a pro-government militia according to our defini-
tion. One difficulty was patchy information on termina-
tion. In many instances, the groups simply ceased to be
mentioned in the news reports. Therefore, there is often
missing data on group termination. This problem of
establishing group ‘life-cycles’ is not a problem particular
to PGMs, but extends to research on groups more gen-
erally (e.g. Berkhout & Lowery, 2008).
PGM characteristics
As outlined above, we distinguished between informal
and semi-official PGMs. Furthermore, we identify how
the PGM is linked to the government, for example to the
state or military institution, an individual person, such as
the president or a minister, a political party, or the sub-
national government. We recorded all links that are iden-
tified in the sources.
The database includes variables that capture various
other characteristics including the sources of support for
the groups, such as a foreign government, landowners, or
being self-maintained through plunder and looting. We
recorded the geographical location of the activities of the
groups as precisely as possible and include a minimum
and maximum headcount of each group where the
sources provide these kinds of information. We recorded
membership characteristics, for example whether it was
ethnic or ideology-based, whether the group recruits
children or adolescents, or whether their membership
was urban or rural-based. We also coded alleged targets,
such as armed and unarmed political opposition, crim-
inals, and civilians, as well as group purposes, such as
fighting insurgents, intimidating civilians, or gathering
intelligence.
Procedures and missing data
Some countries or groups receive more attention than
others in the news media. But we expect that the range
of sources used and the length of the period for which
data are collected reduce the problem of overlooking
groups in less prominent countries or conflicts. Never-
theless, we expect that the dataset underrepresents
PGMs, which is partly a function of differences in the
availability of sources across the time period.
As we rely on news sources to describe the link of a
group to government, another difficulty is the potential
misspecification of a PGM’s relationship to the govern-
ment. Using multiple sources through LexisNexis across
time is likely to reduce this problem. If the source is
ambiguous about the relationship between the national
government and the group, or if different sources contra-
dict each other in their classification of the link between
the government and the group, more information is
sought from country-specific sources and academic
research. In cases where we could not establish the status
of the group as separate from regular forces, we noted the
3 See http://www.sqlite.org. Sqlite is free relational database system
that may be queried using SQL, for example via R or directly. The
software necessary to query Sqlite databases directly is built into
computers running Mac OSX and Linux, and is available for
Windows. Sqlite databases are contained in a single file that can be
easily transported between different operating systems and requires
no complicated installation procedures.
4 Whenever we found evidence for groups preceding or succeeding
other PGMs, we have recorded such links and possible name changes.
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group in the codebook but did not include it in the
database.
The data
For the period between 1981 and 2007 we have coded
332 PGMs. As shown in Table I, about two-thirds are
classified as informal PGMs, which are loosely affiliated
with and linked to the government, while one-third are
identified as semi-official PGMs.
In Table II we identify four possible links between the
militias and the government: to an institution of the state
or the military, to individual members of the state appa-
ratus, to the governing political party, or to a subnational
government. Groups can have more than one link to
government. For 64% of PGMs the link was to an insti-
tution, either to the state or to the military. About one-
third of PGMs are linked to an individual, such as the
president, prime minister or another government minis-
ter. In 16% of cases the PGM is connected to the polit-
ical party in power and in only 10% to the subnational
government. More localized groups may be less easy to
observe using our search procedure.
Tables III and IV show common membership charac-
teristics as well as the most frequently reported targets.
Members of PGMs have a range of characteristics, with-
out one characteristic being particularly dominant.
Member characteristics were drawn inductively from the
available sources. The most common characteristic,
although applying to less than one-third of the groups,
was belonging to an ethnic group. For 20% of the groups
the sources reported that ‘volunteers’ had joined the
government militias, while 18% of PGMs were made
up of villagers, 17% were ideology-based and 17% of
PGMs had adolescent members. Other membership
groups include former soldiers or former rebels. Stani-
land (2012) analyzes insurgents defecting to the govern-
ment, and such groups are also included in the database
from the time they become pro-government.
For alleged targets, we coded one or more mentions of
any alleged target. Just over 60% of PGMs targeted
armed opposition groups. In most cases, governments
use informal armed groups to counter a threat to their
rule in the form of armed opposition. At some distance,
unarmed opposition, such as members of opposition par-
ties or outspoken government critics (in 37% of cases)
and civilians (in 35% of cases) emerged as the next most
common targets of PGMs. Our data collection also
shows that ordinary civilians were often targeted by
PGMs. Ethnic groups were also frequently identified as
targets, but at 16%, ethnic groups appear to be a less fre-
quent target. It may be that opposition groups have an
ethnic dimension that is not picked up in the reporting
of the conflict.
In addition to the data that use the group as the unit
of analysis, we provide datasets with the country-year as
unit of analysis, containing basic information on the
number of active PGMs and the number of countries
with at least one PGM in a particular year between
Table I. PGM types
Type Freq. Percentage
Informal PGMs 218 66
Semi-official PGMs 114 34
Total 332 100
Table II. Links to government
Government link Freq. Percentage
State or military institution 211 64
Individual state official 117 35
Political party 54 16
Subnational government 34 10
Unclear 4 1
No information 4 1
The percentages do not add up to 100 because a group can have mul-
tiple links to government.
Table III. Most common member characteristics
Member characteristic Freq. Percentage
Ethnicity 95 29
Volunteers 68 20
Village/rural areas 58 18
Ideology 55 17
Adolescents 55 17
Religion 42 13
Security forces 40 12
Party activists 40 12
The percentages do not add up to 100 because a group can have mul-
tiple membership characteristics.
Table IV. Most common PGM targets
Target Freq. Percentage
Armed opposition 201 61
Unarmed opposition 122 37
Civilians 116 35
Ethnic group 54 16
A group can have multiple targets. The percentages do not add up to
100 because a group can have multiple membership characteristics.
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1981 and 2007. To capture the duration of the militias,
we used the information on origin and termination as
discussed above. To circumvent the problem of missing
data on termination, we recorded the years during which
these groups have been found to be active. Examples of
such activities could include anything from training exer-
cises to operations and acts of violence. Whenever we
were unable to identify a termination date for a militia,
we used the last year of recorded activity as a proxy for
termination.5 In these cases, the militia group is assumed
to exist for all years between the date of origin and last
year of recorded activity.
Figure 1 presents the total number of active groups
annually from 1981 to 2007. The figure shows a general
upward trend throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The
number of pro-government militias peaks in 1999 and
then drops off substantially. We are not yet sure of the
reasons behind the sharp decline of PGMs. In part this
pattern could be a result of lagged reporting. Sometimes
news reports published several years after the event pro-
vide further details on PGMs and their activities in ear-
lier years.
Figure 2 graphs the total number of countries with at
least one PGM per year. As for the data presented in Fig-
ure 1, groups with unspecified dates of dissolution are
estimated to have ended in the year of their last recorded
activity. Our data show a slight downward trend in the
number of countries with PGMs during the 1980s, and
a drop after a small increase in 2004. Again the decline
towards the end of the data collection could partly be due
to limited information available for the most recent time
period. Countries with the highest number of PGMs are
Indonesia with 37, Sudan with 21, and the Philippines
with 19, possibly suggesting an ‘archipelago effect’ where
difficult terrain induces a government to rely on local
forces.
Table V shows the correlation of PGMs with civil
war, using the 25 battle-related deaths threshold from
the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD) (Gle-
ditsch et al., 2002). Using country-years as the unit of
analysis, 43% of PGMs are present in countries experi-
encing civil war. Most of the time PGMs are found out-
side of armed conflict. Focusing on civil wars, most civil
wars are characterized by the presence of militias (81% of
civil wars). In short, accounting for militias fighting on
the government side is likely to be important for captur-
ing the dynamics of internal conflict and the prospects
for peace, but these groups cannot be treated as simply
epiphenomenal to civil wars.
Usefulness of the data
To illustrate uses of the data, we analyze civil war, adding
our PGM measure to a standard model of armed con-
flict. We expect PGMs to increase the risk of armed con-
flict because they offer governments a low-cost response
Figure 1. Number of PGMs worldwide, 1981–2007
5 When neither date was available the group was considered to exist
until the end of the reporting period.
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to insurgents while complicating the incentive structure
on which a settlement of the conflict might be built.
Based on the large quantitative literature (e.g. Fearon
& Laitin, 2003; Hegre & Sambanis, 2006; Ross,
2006; Wimmer, Cederman & Min 2009), the model
includes mountainous terrain, ethnic exclusion, natural
resources, democracy, economic development, and pop-
ulation size. We model the incidence of civil war, not
onset, due to the extremely small number of onsets in
our dataset, which is restricted to start in 1981. We oper-
ationalize incidence with the ACD measure mentioned
above. The data on terrain come from Fearon & Laitin
(2003), resources are measured with oil production
figures from Ross (2011), and GDP per capita and
population size are taken from the World Bank. For eth-
nicity, we use the ethnic exclusion measure from
Wimmer, Cederman & Min (2009) and for democracy
the xpolity measure (Vreeland, 2008).6 We use a logit
model with robust standard errors, clustered on countries.
Similar to Ross’s (2006) study on civil war, we include a
counter for the peace years and three cubic splines to cor-
rect for serial correlation (Beck, Katz & Tucker, 1998).
Due to data availability, our analysis covers 1981 to
2005. The first model in Table VI analyzes civil war with
the standard set of explanatory variables. In the second
model we add the PGM dummy variable indicating
whether a country in a particular year had at least one
pro-government militia (coded 1) or not (coded 0). In the
third model we separate this PGM variable into two sep-
arate indicators, distinguishing between informal and
semi-official pro-government militias. The findings of the
first model match current research on civil war with the
exception of Mountainous terrain and Oil production,
which are statistically insignificant, perhaps due to the
restricted time period of the analysis. The fit of the model
with the PGM variable appears to be better, given the
larger Wald w2 and pseudo R2 statistics. The PGM
dummy variable is highly statistically significant and pos-
itive. Converting the logit coefficient gives an odds ratio of
4.172; the risk of civil war occurrence is almost five times
larger when PGMs are present. When distinguishing
between informal and semi-official PGMs in the third
Figure 2. Number of countries with at least one PGM, 1981–2007
Table V. PGMs and armed conflict
PGMs
Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict
0 1 Total
0 2,489 143 2,632
94.57% 5.43% 100%
75.84% 18.99% 65.23%
1 793 610 1,403
56.52% 43.48% 100%
24.16% 81.01% 22.68%
Total 3,576 753 4,035
81.34% 18.66% 100%
100% 100% 100%
6 We transformed the three transitional codes –66, –77, and –88 in
line with the transformation done in the polity2 measure (Marshall,
Gurr & Jaggers, 2010).
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model, again both militia variables are statistically signifi-
cant at p < 0.001. Converting the coefficients into odds
ratios, the probability of civil war is just over 2.5 times
greater in countries with informal PGMs and 3.7 times
greater with semi-official PGMs.
There are further issues to investigate including likely
endogeneity between PGMs and conflict, yet this brief
analysis of intrastate conflict suggests that information
on PGMs may provide valuable insights beyond the
standard models. For conflict scholars, informal actors
are likely to influence the nature and duration of conflict.
They may have incentives to act as ‘spoilers’ and prolong
the conflict. The consequences of governments deciding
to use these sorts of groups may be assessed in terms of
their impact on the well-being of civilian populations
and on human rights protection using the new PGM
dataset. For scholars interested in the well-being of the
state, ethnic and political cleavages, and the institutional
bases of collective action, party politics and election vio-
lence, these groups provide an opportunity for theory
development and empirical analysis.
Conclusion
Despite the sometimes highly visible activities of pro-
government militias in Europe, Latin America, Asia and
Africa, there has been no large-scale systematic compara-
tive research on why these forces form and how they
affect the risk of internal conflict, civil war and harm
to civilians. Because of the increasing role of non-state
actors generally, and the significant presence that they
have had in conflicts across countries, it is important
Table VI. Logit estimates on the incidence of intrastate conflict, 1981–2007
Standard model PGM variable Two PGM types
Pro-government militias 1.428***
(0.227)
Informal PGMs 0.969***
(0.235)
Semi-official PGMs 1.309***
(0.231)
GDP per capitaa –0.533*** –0.601*** –0.564***
(0.151) (0.141) (0.141)
Population sizea 0.260** 0.107 0.037
(0.098) (0.106) (0.104)
Regime type 0.058* 0.040 0.039
(0.026) (0.025) (0.025)
Oil productiona 0.012 0.016 0.014
(0.018) (0.017) (0.017)
Size of excluded populationa 0.155*** 0.126*** 0.121**
(0.036) (0.035) (0.035)
Mountainous terraina 0.089 0.047 0.074
(0.075) (0.079) (0.079)
Peace years –2.414*** –2.223*** –2.136***
(0.200) (0.192) (0.190)
Spline 1 –0.201*** –0.158*** –0.176***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Spline 2 0.040*** 0.037*** 0.035***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Spline 3 –0.004* –0.003 –0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 2.846* 3.932** 4.150**
(1.350) (1.321) (1.309)
Pseudo R-squared 0.56 0.58 0.59
Wald Chi-squared 433.15*** 434.92*** 555.63***
Pseudo Log-Likelihood –672.96 –630.88 –618.84
Number of clusters 142 141 141
Number of observations 3093 3087 3087
Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on countries. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
a The natural log was taken of these variables, with 0.5 being added to all values beforehand.
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to collect information on these groups and to seek to
improve transparency on their links to governments,
assuming that governments that back these groups have
a responsibility for their actions. The PGMD enables the
academic community to investigate the conditions under
which these groups are formed and dismantled and what
impact they have on the security and stability of their
host countries. The data will likely be useful to scholars
working on state capacity and control, conflict and
repression and collective action more broadly. Given the
span across time and space, we expect our database to be
more useful for making cross-country and cross-time
comparisons than for carrying out in-depth qualitative
case studies for specific countries – although given the
amount of information we have gathered on the groups,
we hope that our database will provide a useful starting
point for such endeavours. We anticipate that the
PGMD will also be of interest to policymakers, the
media, and non-academic users concerned with conflict
and human rights related issues. By focusing on these
organizations, these data allow researchers and policy-
makers to obtain a more comprehensive estimate of the
repressive apparatus of a country than that provided by
relying on the size of formal security forces alone.
Beyond the problem of theories focusing attention on
state actors rather than non-state actors, there is simply
a lack of available data on these groups. The Pro-
Government Militias Database addresses this deficit.
Replication Data
The dataset, codebook and do-files for the empirical
analysis in this article can be found at http://
www.prio.no/jpr/datasets and at http://www.sowi.uni-
mannheim.de/militias/.
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